ChapterS
The Postwar Period: 1946-1950
The Institute
With the end of hostilities in Europe and the Pacific, MIT faced the task of reconversiontc peacetime activities. This called for the demobilization of wartime projects, the organization of instruction for returning veterans and other students, the rebuilding of a long-range educational program, and the planning of research, as well as the necessary physical and financial arrangements.
The wartime constraints were being removed and prewar goals reestablished, but the reconversion was far more than a return
to the status quo of 1939.
Many of MIT's staff had been dispersed functionally or geographically. There had been a Significant diversion from normal educational activities. Scientists and engineers from other institutions had come to work at the MIT campus. A great deal of professional cross-fertilization had occurred. A generation of students with new outlooks and motivations was about to enroll. The political, social, psychological, and intellectual environment differed greatly from what it had been only half a dozen years earlier.
Several questions were raised by the demobilization of wartime projects: At what pace was a given project to be liquidated or transferred to another unit? Which projects should be continued at the Institute? What should be done with past or ongoing classified research?
The World War I precedent was not reassuring. At the end of that war important scientific and technical developments such as the thermionic and cathode ray tubes had been put on the shelf by the government (Bement).
At the end of World War II, it was clear that many projects could not be discontinued. For example, the research on nuclear materials under Professors Chipman, Cohen and Kaufmann was transferred from the MIT Metallurgical Project to an off-campus location and was eventually turned over to
51
Nuclear Metals Incorporated. A personal account of this project by a staff member was privately published (Santangelo). The research of Professors Gaudin and Schuhmann on uranium ores remained at MIT under strict security for some time after the war.
The resumption of normal teaching created problems (Killian). The number of students grew rapidly into a tidal wave causing operational difficulties. Changes in the scientific and technical environment and in the general intellectual climate called for a new educational philosophy. The situation offered unique opportunities for innovation. Viewed from the distance of 40 years, MIT's administration, faculty and staff deserve much credit for not allowing immediate operating problems to interfere with the rethinking of the educational program.
The teaching overload was met by continuing the wartime schedule of three regular terms per year, offering major courses in each term, and using the plant with maximum efficiency. The housing problem was solved in part by a program providing quarters for married students, especially returning veterans= the first such program in the country (Killian, p. 314).
Only a few years after the end of the war, a committee under the chairmanship of Professor Warren K. Lewis of the Department of Chemical Engineering examined the Institute's undergraduate program. The "Report of the Committee on Educational Survey to the Faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology" (1949) recommended a strengthening of general education at MIT. This recommendation was implemented effectively.
The Department of Metallurgy
World War II had brought fundamental changes to the science and technology of metals, ceramics, and other materials. The development of atomic energy had led to the entirely new science and technology of nuclear materials concerned with such metals as uranium, plutonium, and beryllium, as well as with ceramics. The atomic energy project had called special attention to the importance of materials processing. It also demonstrated how much the collaboration of the fundamental sciences of physics and chemistry with applied disciplines such as metallurgy and ceramics could accomplish. It revealed challenging aspects of materials research and, in fact, acted as a curtain raiser for materials science and engineering.
There had been many other important materials developments. The National Emergency steels, new magnesium technology, and new aluminum alloys had extended the range and depth of applied metallurgy. jet engines, gas turbines, and other advanced technologies depended on high-temperature alloys. New materials, especially polymers, assumed major importance. Research problems such as the ship steel problem became especially urgent because of wartime operations.
The advances in materials technology had been achieved in laboratories operated by industry, the government, and aca-
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52
dernic institutions. No single organization could lay claim to a unique level of contribution. The significant fact in the present context is the high rate of participation by members of MIT's Department of Metallurgy in wartime research and development. Their experiences had a lasting effect on the Department's postwar policies and programs.
Review of Objectives
The period 1939-45 had not been a time for changes in the Department's programs, except for those dictated by the war, but it did not preclude all consideration of objectives and policy. In 1937, before the new undergraduate curriculum went into effect, President Compton had recommended for the metallurgist not only a thorough knowledge of metallurgy but also the highest degree of scientific training, as already quoted in Chapter 4 (Technology Review, Vol. 39, p. 289).
Professor Francis Bitter in an" Abstract of the Present
State and Possible Developments in Physical Metallurgy" wrote
in the Fall of 1939: " ... in this field ... there is now an opportunity for rapid and fundamental development through an appreciation of the concepts and techniques of physics and chemistry." He emphasized the need for a more "fundamental attitude" and research undertaken with aims of "formulating physical laws" rather than with industrial aims. Bitter, after naming several "fundamental problems of metallurgy," suggested that there should
be an expert on each of these in the Department and proposed bringing in specialists. Professor Williams responded, explaining that lack of money prevented the carrying out of such a plan, but expressing interest in Bitter's ideas and proposing a meeting of several professors close to physics, metallurgy, and the physics of metals. Williams, on December 21,1939, also wrote to the Chairman of the Visiting Committee proposing several types of programs.
In a memorandum to Acting President Killian dated May 23, 1945, Williams described a possible Division of Engineering Materials, which would serve both Mechanical Engineering and Metallurgy "in the Metals Processing Laboratory." The Division would give instruction and would provide research facilities in engineering materials "to any course, especially" and III" (Mechanical Engineering and Metallurgy). One section would deal with metals and another with "nonmetallic materials (timber, rope, concrete, plastics, glass, ceramics)."
In another memorandum, Williams wrote that "the great weakness in the department lies in the field of what can be called rather inadequately 'Mechanical Metallurgy.' This is related to Metal Processing, where the metallurgist is concerned with the 'effects of the operations on the characteristics of the metal.":
Most of these projections were soon to be realized in the Metals Processing Division established in 1946 (see below) and the Metals Processing Laboratory in 1952 (see Chapter 6).
On September 11, 1945, Professor Williams forwarded to Executive Vice President Killian a memorandum by Professor
53
Howard F. Taylor
FH. Norton entitled "A Plan for Post-War Undergraduate Study in Metallurgy." Williams strongly endorsed its basic philosophy, but added that "certain details do not seem practicable in the near future."
Norton's memorandum distinguished three parts of the undergraduate curriculum in metallurgy: (i) general education;
(ii) technical education based on the fundamental sciences; and (iii) instruction in metallurgy. He considered the arguments for and against a single option versus several options such as process metallurgy and physical metallurgy. Norton favored a sin-
gle option partly on the grounds that industry preferred people with a good background in basic subjects rather than shallower training in specialties. For a single option, he proposed a balance between process and physical metallurgy. He guestioned whether mineral dressing should be taught to undergraduates in the Department since he considered it more closely related to mining engineering than to metallurgy. His approach was pragmatic and he proposed basing decisions on the working experience of graduates of the Department.
Norton also considered staff requirements and particularly the qualifications of staff members-He stressed the importance of laboratories in undergraduate education. He stated that the nonferrous metallurgy laboratory needed to be revitalized. Laboratories should illustrate principles rather than reproduce processes. Although his memorandum was not directly concerned with graduate education, he emphasized the need for a graduate school to keep undergraduate teaching vital. He argued that a graduate school required fellowships in order to support graduate students and that industry would provide financial aid only if there were good physical facilities making good research possible.
Undergraduate Education
In 1946, Professor Chipman, the incoming head of the Department, approached the fundamental restructuring of the undergraduate curriculum in metallurgy as a major task and opportunity. In his first report to President Compton dated May 13, 1946, he described his conception of metallurgy as including science and engineering. He made a case for a strong scientific program in the Department. Although he acknowledged the overlapping of the subject matter of metallurgy with physics, chemistry, mining engineering, chemical engineering, and mechanical engineering, he gave compelling reasons for maintaining a separate department,
In the next year's report dated May 19, 1947, Chipman discussed the new curriculum. He pointed out that the previous year's outline had served as the basis of the new curriculum, "which, by the way, has the unanimous endorsement of the Department." In particular, it "replaced the previous descriptive courses with new and more quantitative subjects." It also gave students "the largest possible measure of free choice among the more specialized or advanced subjects" and accordingly onefourth of the senior program consisted of electives.
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54
Chapter 5: The Postwar Period: 1946-1950
The Institute
With the end of hostilities in Europe and the Pacific, MIT faced the task of reconversion to peacetime activities. This called for the demobilization of wartime projects, the organization of instruction for returning veterans and other students, the rebuilding of a long-range educational program, and the planning of research, as well as the necessary physical and financial arrangements. The wartime constraints were being removed and prewar goals reestablished, but the reconversion was far more than a return to the status quo of 1939.
Many of MIT's staff had been dispersed functionally or geographically. There had been a significant diversion from normal educational activities. Scientists and engineers from other institutions had come to work at the MIT campus. A great deal of professional cross-fertilization had occurred. A generation of students with new outlooks and motivations was about to enroll. The political, social, psychological, and intellectual environment differed greatly from what it had been only half a dozen years earlier.
Several questions were raised by the demobilization of wartime projects: At what pace was a given project to be liquidated or transferred to another unit? Which projects should be continued at the Institute? What should be done with past or ongoing classified research?
The World War I precedent was not reassuring. At the end of that war important scientific and technical developments such as the thermionic and cathode ray tubes had been put on the shelf by the government (Bement).
At the end of World War II, it was clear that many projects could not be discontinued. For example, the research on nuclear materials under Professors Chipman, Cohen and Kaufmann was transferred from the MIT Metallurgical Project to an off-campus location and was eventually turned over to Nuclear Metals Incorporated. A personal account of this project by a staff member was privately published (Santangelo). The research of Professors Gaudin and Schuhmann on uranium ores remained at MIT under strict security for some time after the war.
The resumption of normal teaching created problems (Killian). The number of students grew rapidly into a tidal wave causing operational difficulties. Changes in the scientific and technical environment and in the general intellectual climate called for a new educational philosophy. The situation offered unique opportunities for innovation. Viewed from the distance of 40 years, MIT's administration, faculty and staff deserve much credit for not allowing immediate operating problems to interfere with the rethinking of the educational program.
The teaching overload was met by continuing the wartime schedule of three regular terms per year, offering major courses in each term, and using the plant with maximum efficiency. The housing problem was solved in part by a program providing quarters for married students, especially returning veterans= the first such program in the country (Killian, p. 314).
Only a few years after the end of the war, a committee under the chairmanship of Professor Warren K. Lewis of the Department of Chemical Engineering examined the Institute's undergraduate program. The "Report of the Committee on Educational Survey to the Faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology" (1949) recommended a strengthening of general education at MIT. This recommendation was implemented effectively.
The Department of Metallurgy
World War II had brought fundamental changes to the science and technology of metals, ceramics, and other materials. The development of atomic energy had led to the entirely new science and technology of nuclear materials concerned with such metals as uranium, plutonium, and beryllium, as well as with ceramics. The atomic energy project had called special attention to the importance of materials processing. It also demonstrated how much the collaboration of the fundamental sciences of physics and chemistry with applied disciplines such as metallurgy and ceramics could accomplish. It revealed challenging aspects of materials research and, in fact, acted as a curtain raiser for materials science and engineering.
There had been many other important materials developments. The National Emergency steels, new magnesium technology, and new aluminum alloys had extended the range and depth of applied metallurgy. jet engines, gas turbines, and other advanced technologies depended on high-temperature alloys. New materials, especially polymers, assumed major importance. Research problems such as the ship steel problem became especially urgent because of wartime operations.
The advances in materials technology had been achieved in laboratories operated by industry, the government, and acadernic institutions. No single organization could lay claim to a unique level of contribution. The significant fact in the present context is the high rate of participation by members of MIT's Department of Metallurgy in wartime research and development. Their experiences had a lasting effect on the Department's postwar policies and programs.
Review of Objectives
The period 1939-45 had not been a time for changes in the Department's programs, except for those dictated by the war, but it did not preclude all consideration of objectives and policy. In 1937, before the new undergraduate curriculum went into effect, President Compton had recommended for the metallurgist not only a thorough knowledge of metallurgy but also the highest degree of scientific training, as already quoted in Chapter 4 (Technology Review, Vol. 39, p. 289).
Professor Francis Bitter in an "Abstract of the Present State and Possible Developments in Physical Metallurgy" wrote in the Fall of 1939: " ... in this field ... there is now an opportunity for rapid and fundamental development through an appreciation of the concepts and techniques of physics and chemistry." He emphasized the need for a more "fundamental attitude" and research undertaken with aims of "formulating physical laws" rather than with industrial aims. Bitter, after naming several "fundamental problems of metallurgy," suggested that there should be an expert on each of these in the Department and proposed bringing in specialists. Professor Williams responded, explaining that lack of money prevented the carrying out of such a plan, but expressing interest in Bitter's ideas and proposing a meeting of several professors close to physics, metallurgy, and the physics of metals. Williams, on December 21,1939, also wrote to the Chairman of the Visiting Committee proposing several types of programs.
In a memorandum to Acting President Killian dated May 23, 1945, Williams described a possible Division of Engineering Materials, which would serve both Mechanical Engineering and Metallurgy "in the Metals Processing Laboratory." The Division would give instruction and would provide research facilities in engineering materials "to any course, especially II and III" (Mechanical Engineering and Metallurgy). One section would deal with metals and another with "nonmetallic materials (timber, rope, concrete, plastics, glass, ceramics)."
In another memorandum, Williams wrote that "the great weakness in the department lies in the field of what can be called rather inadequately 'Mechanical Metallurgy.' This is related to Metal Processing, where the metallurgist is concerned with the 'effects of the operations on the characteristics of the metal.'" Most of these projections were soon to be realized in the Metals Processing Division established in 1946 (see below) and the Metals Processing Laboratory in 1952 (see Chapter 6).
On September 11, 1945, Professor Williams forwarded to Executive Vice President Killian a memorandum by Professor F.H. Norton entitled "A Plan for Post-War Undergraduate Study in Metallurgy." Williams strongly endorsed its basic philosophy, but added that "certain details do not seem practicable in the near future."
Norton's memorandum distinguished three parts of the undergraduate curriculum in metallurgy: (i) general education; (ii) technical education based on the fundamental sciences; and (iii) instruction in metallurgy. He considered the arguments for and against a single option versus several options such as process metallurgy and physical metallurgy. Norton favored a single option partly on the grounds that industry preferred people with a good background in basic subjects rather than shallower training in specialties. For a single option, he proposed a balance between process and physical metallurgy. He questioned whether mineral dressing should be taught to undergraduates in the Department since he considered it more closely related to mining engineering than to metallurgy. His approach was pragmatic and he proposed basing decisions on the working experience of graduates of the Department.
Norton also considered staff requirements and particularly the qualifications of staff members. He stressed the importance of laboratories in undergraduate education. He stated that the nonferrous metallurgy laboratory needed to be revitalized. Laboratories should illustrate principles rather than reproduce processes. Although his memorandum was not directly concerned with graduate education, he emphasized the need for a graduate school to keep undergraduate teaching vital. He argued that a graduate school required fellowships in order to support graduate students and that industry would provide financial aid only if there were good physical facilities making good research possible.
Undergraduate Education
In 1946, Professor Chipman, the incoming head of the Department, approached the fundamental restructuring of the undergraduate curriculum in metallurgy as a major task and opportunity. In his first report to President Compton dated May 13, 1946, he described his conception of metallurgy as including science and engineering. He made a case for a strong scientific program in the Department. Although he acknowledged the overlapping of the subject matter of metallurgy with physics, chemistry, mining engineering, chemical engineering, and mechanical engineering, he gave compelling reasons for maintaining a separate department.
In the next year's report dated May 19, 1947, Chipman discussed the new curriculum. He pointed out that the previous year's outline had served as the basis of the new curriculum, "which, by the way, has the unanimous endorsement of the Department." In particular, it "replaced the previous descriptive courses with new and more quantitative subjects." It also gave students "the largest possible measure of free choice among the more specialized or advanced subjects" and accordingly one-fourth of the senior program consisted of electives.